A series of studies conducted over the last fifteen years has produced a near-consensus that the Social Security Disability Insurance system (SSDI) has substantial disincentive effects on the labor supply of near-elderly males, diminishing labor force participation, increasing the sensitivity of labor force exit decisions to adverse economic shocks and encouraging those nearing retirement to claim disability benefits and subsequently transfer onto the Social Security retirement program.
1 Yet, efforts by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to encourage labor supply among the disabled by removing the work disincentives built into SSDI have been almost entirely unsuccessful. Most notably, Congress in 1999 authorized the Ticket to Work program, which provides an array of inducements for current SSDI beneficiaries to take up employment, including: permitting a "trial work period" of up to nine months, providing 7.75 years of ongoing Medicare eligibility following return to work, and providing three years of automatic benefit reinstatement when claimant's earnings workplace fall below a threshold level. Each of these steps reduces the implicit tax placed on labor supply by the SSDI program. Despite these lures, fewer than 1,400 tickets of 12.2 million tickets issued to date have led to successful workforce integration (0.01 percent).
This paper calls attention to, and presents preliminary evidence on, a neglected explanation for why efforts to encourage return-to-work among the disabled by reducing the implicit tax on labor supply have met with little success. Our core observation is that SSDI, and indeed all nonwork-contingent retirement programs, discourages work through two channels. The first is the canonical substitution effect: because a return to work ultimately means sacrificing benefits (what SSDI beneficiaries call "the cash cliff"), SSDI recipients face a financial incentive to remain non-employed. A second is the income effect: given the transfer payments and in-kind services (particularly medical care) provided by SSDI, many beneficiaries may prefer leisure to labor-or, more precisely, an early retirement-even if work is not implicitly taxed by the SSDI program. Concretely, a hypothetical SSDI beneficiary granted $12,000 per year in income support plus Medicare benefits paying an average of $7,700 annually may prefer an early retirement over continued participation in the labor force. This scenario seems particularly plausible when one considers that the modal SSDI recipient is a near-elderly male with a high school education (thus, below-median potential earnings) and, possibly a significant degree of physical discomfort in performing workplace tasks.
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The distinction between these two channels-income and substitution effects-through which SSDI reduces labor supply and expedites early retirement is central to policy. To our knowledge, all prior efforts by the Congress and the SSA to increase labor force participation among SSDI recipients-including the Ticket to Work program-have precisely targeted the substitution effect; that is, they have reduced the implicit tax on work. Such policies rest on the assumption that, were it not for the implicit tax that SSDI levies on labor supply, many beneficiaries would prefer to work (i.e., while keeping their benefits). If, however, the primary means by which SSDI reduces labor force participation and hastens retirement is through an income effect, such efforts may be close to ineffectual.
The conceptual distinction between income and substitution effects is also central to welfare analysis: if SSDI reduces labor supply through the substitution effect, this implies a deadweight loss; in effect, SSDI is pays beneficiaries to not work. By contrast, reductions in labor supply that are due to the income effect do not imply a deadweight loss since there is no distortion of incentives.
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I. Estimating Income Effects of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
We know of no research that attempts to distinguish income from substitution effects in the relationship between SSDI receipt and labor supply. 4 A likely reason is that, since its inception, the SSDI program has provided benefits exclusively on a work-contingent basis, so income and substitution effects cannot readily be separated. SSDI is not, however, the sole transfer program that provides income support to the non-elderly disabled. Though almost ignored by researchers, provides an opportunity to study the income effect of receipt of disability benefits on the labor supply and retirement decisions of a relevant population of near-elderly individuals, the majority of whom were work-capable at the time of benefit receipt though not necessarily in good health.
II. A Model of Early Retirement Decisions under Work-Contingent and Non-Contingent Transfer Programs
Though many features of the VDC and SSDI programs differ, the crucial distinction that we focus on here is that the SSDI program is work-contingent (thus, inducing both income and substitution effects) while the VDC program is not (thus, inducing only substitution effects). To contrast the behavioral and welfare differences that follow from this distinction, we present a brief model of work and retirement decisions among the working-age disabled in which we compare two otherwise identical cash transfer programs that differ only in one respect: whether or not receipt of transfer income requires early retirement. We provide the main equations of the model below, with further details available in an online appendix (link to online appendix).
Consider an economy composed of agents who live for three periods. In the first period, agents work with certainty and have the option to save. In the second period, they may continue to work and save or may choose to retire and consume out of savings. In the third period, they receive retirement benefits, Given non-satiation and state-independent utility, the agent's optimal consumption path is given
. The agent chooses an early retirement iff:
Early retirement is more likely if: (1) the disutility of work is high; (2) the retirement benefit is large; or (3) wage income is low (since, for low wage workers, the consumption gain from working is small relative to the disutility of labor).
A. An unanticipated non-contingent cash transfer
Consider a set of agents who at the start of period two receive an unanticipated noncontingent cash transfer of 
will choose to retire early upon receiving v , reflecting the pure income effect of transfer income on labor supply. This (unanticipated) early retirement is more likely if (1) the disutility of work is high; (2) the cash transfer is large; or (3) the wage is low.
B. An unanticipated work-contingent cash transfer
Consider now a set of agents who at the start of period two receive an unanticipated work- There are, however, two groups of agents who will be differentially affected by the two programs. A first is the agents for whom the work constraint binds under d , leading to an early retirement. These agents are characterized by the following inequality:
Because these agents would otherwise work until the full retirement age if receipt of the transfer payment were not work-contingent, their early retirement represents a deadweight loss, (stemming from the substitution effect). Implicitly, these agents receive d as payment for retiring early. The likelihood that inequality (4) is satisfied is initially rising and then falling in the wage.
A second set of agents differentially affected by d and v are those who will choose to forfeit the transfer payment d in period two rather than retire early. These agents are characterized by the following inequality:
Although these agents would receive a period two transfer payment under the v program and not the d program, the lack of a behavioral effect of either program indicates that there is no efficiency loss from their not receiving this transfer payment. The likelihood that inequality (5) is satisfied is rising in the wage.
C. Behavioral and welfare consequences of transfer income
The results of the model are summarized in The contrast between groups (2) and (3) highlights a trade-off in the design of income transfer programs. Imposing a non-work constraint (as in program d ) increases deadweight losses by inducing early retirement among work-ready beneficiaries. However, the non-work constraint also increases target efficiency by reducing the incentive for high-income workers to claim transfer benefits.
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We emphasize that this illustrative model differs in two central respects from the VDC and SSDI programs. First, in practice, the size of Veterans Disability Compensation transfer payments are increasing in the severity of disability and are independent of past earnings. Thus, v is likely to depend positively on an agent's disutility of work, which should increase targeting efficiency of VDC relative to a similar program with a flat benefit. Second, under the SSDI program, the amount of the transfer benefit depends positively on past earnings but is independent of the degree of disability. This feature is likely to increase labor supply distortions from the SSDI program since, holding disutility of work constant, high income workers will face a stronger incentive to exit the labor force to qualify for SSDI benefits than they would under a similar program with a flat benefit.
III. Preliminary analysis using the Current Population Survey
The model suggests that unanticipated increases in unearned income caused by the change in Vietnam era veterans. And as shown in ).
Columns (2A) and (2B) show that both the likelihood of receiving VA benefits and the average amount of VA benefits received increased by significantly more for Vietnam era veterans during the post policy period. This pattern is perhaps not surprising given that the control group was not eligible for these benefits, though it is worth noting that Duggan, Rosenheck and Singleton (2006) estimate a similarly large increase in VA benefits for Vietnam era veterans relative to veterans from other eras given stable rates of benefit receipt for these other groups. Notably, the point estimate for 1 β in the Any VA benefits receipt of 1.54
percentage points in column (2A) is considerably smaller in absolute magnitude than the corresponding decline in the probability of Any Earnings (-3.58 percentage points). Thus, the relative decline in labor force participation among Vietnam vets was larger than the increase in their probability of VDC receipt. While this could partially be explained by the fact that many existing VDC recipients experienced an increase in their benefits because of the policy change, it is also plausible that some other factor is exerting a differential effect on their labor supply as well (again, highlighting the preliminary nature of our analysis).
In columns (4) through (8), we consider all other major components of income. The most important finding here is that the probability and amount of any Social Security benefits or of any other retirement income increased by substantially more for Vietnam era veterans than for their counterparts born in other eras. This may indicate that individuals applied for SSDI, claimed early Social Security retirement benefits, or initiated withdrawals from a 401k or private pension plan when leaving the labor force. One item of concern in this table is that Vietnam era veterans were significantly more likely to be receiving some form of retirement income (specification 4A) prior to the policy change and the amount of this income was both statistically and economically significant (specification 4B). While this pattern is readily explained by the fact that many veterans receive a military pension while participating in the civilian labor force, it further underscores that non-veterans are an imperfect comparison group for veterans. Table 3 presents similar specifications for several more direct measures of labor supply. The first column of results shows that labor force non-participation increased by significantly more for Vietnam era veterans than for the non veteran males in our control group, with this increase almost equally split between retirement and disability as shown in columns (2) and (3). Notably, there is no significant change in the treatment-control contrast in the probability of being out of the labor force for reasons other than retirement or disability (column (4)). Finally, columns (5) and (6) show that weeks worked declined significantly for Vietnam era veterans while the probability of zero work hours significantly increased. The results in column (7), where the outcome variable is an indicator for the presence of a work-limiting disability or health condition, suggest that Vietnam era veterans were more likely to be disabled prior to the policy change and that this difference increased in more recent years.
IV. Conclusions
Our results above provide initial evidence that the increase in unearned income resulting from the expansion of the VDC program's medical eligibility criteria in 2001 substantially lowered labor supply among Vietnam era veterans. Such large behavioral responses to the VDC program are noteworthy given that the program does not affect the incentive to work as do the SSDI and SSI programs. These findings therefore highlight the possibility that income effects on labor supply may be sizable for nearly-elderly adults in moderate to poor health.
We stress that these results must be viewed as preliminary. Perhaps the most important limitation of our analysis is that non-veteran males differ in many observable and presumably unobservable ways from Vietnam era veteran males. Thus the differential declines in labor supply observed here may have occurred even in the absence of this policy change. A definitive test of the labor supply response to the extension of VDC benefits awaits better data (which we are currently compiling).
Accurately measuring the magnitude of income and substitution effects of receipt of transfer income on labor supply is critical for improving U.S. disability policy. While economists have typically regarded the substantial reductions in labor force participation associated with receipt of disability benefits as an incentive problem (i.e., a substitution effect), it appears plausible to us that a significant share of this response is explained by the (non-incentive) income effect. When granted permanent, inflation-indexed income and government-provided medical insurance, many near-elderly adults in moderate to poor health may prefer an early retirement to continued labor force participation. If so, there may be limited scope for public policy to increase return-to-work among non-elderly disability recipients by reducing the implicit tax on labor income as, for example, is done by the Social Security Administration's Ticket-to-Work program. For this reason and the others outlined above, further study of the effect of the labor supply effects of the VDC program-which currently provides cash benefits and health insurance to more than 11 percent of military veterans-is warranted. Agents with potential earnings in region CD will work to full retirement age. They will qualify for the non-contingent benefit but not the contingent benefit.
Agents with potential earnings in region AB will choose an early retirement under either program.
A B C D
Agents with potential earnings in region BC will retire early under the contingent benefit program but will work to full retirement age under the non-contingent benefit program.
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